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ARTICLES

COURT REFORM OF 1977: THE
WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT
TEN YEARS LATER
WILLIAM A. BABLITCH*
JUSTICE OF THE WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT
BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE

On April 5, 1977, the voters of the State of Wisconsin overwhelmingly
approved a number of proposed amendments to the Judiciary Article (Art.
VII) of the Wisconsin Constitution. Among the amendments approved was
one allowing the creation of an intermediate court of appeals. In addition,
the supreme court was given supervisory authority over the entire court
structure. In the November 1977 Special Session, the legislature enacted

ch. 187, Laws of 1977, which provided a statutory framework for the implementation of the court of appeals. The court of appeals was sworn in on
August 1, 1978. Thus, one court era ended and another began.
Nearly ten years have passed. The obvious question is whether the
objectives supporting the creation of the court of appeals are being met.
* The author is a 1968 graduate of the University of Wisconsin Law School. From 1969
through 1972 he served as Portage County District Attorney. Elected to the Wisconsin State
Senate in 1972, he became Majority Leader of the Senate in 1976, a position he held until 1982,
and actively participated in the legislature's consideration of court reorganization. He was elected
to the Wisconsin Supreme Court in 1983. He is a frequent lecturer for the Wisconsin Bar Association's Continuing Legal Education program, and is on the faculty of the Institute of Judicial
Administration at the New York University School of Law. He is a member of the American
Law Institute and a member of the advisory board to the State Legislative Leaders Foundation.
Justice Bablitch recently completed his course work at the University of Virginia Law School for
the degree of L.L.M. in the Appellate Process, for which this article served as his thesis.
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The subject of this paper is narrow: a preliminary (and admittedly not
definitive) analysis and evaluation of whether some of the objectives motivating the creation of the court of appeals are being met. The focus is on
the supreme court: the effect of the court of appeals on the supreme court
and whether the problems experienced by the supreme court prior to the
creation of the court of appeals have been alleviated.
Any evaluation, preliminary or definitive, must begin with a full understanding of the objectives sought by the creation of the court of appeals.
Why was it created? What were the then existing and anticipated problems
it sought to resolve? Part One of this paper attempts to answer these questions in two ways: first, by exploring the functions of the supreme court
prior to the creation of the court of appeals and the problems experienced
by the justices who served at that time; second, by exploring the history of
the enabling legislation with particular emphasis on the committees that
were formed to study the problems and suggest resolutions.
In addition to understanding the objectives sought by the creation of the
court of appeals, an analysis and evaluation cannot be done without a full
understanding of the present functions of the supreme court. Without a full
understanding of what the court does now, it is impossible to make any
reasonable judgment as to whether the objectives motivating the creation of
the court of appeals are being met. Part Two of this paper explains those
functions using interviews conducted by the author with each of the justices
who have served on the court since the creation of the court of appeals.
Having explained the objectives sought by the creation of that court,
and the present functions of the supreme court, Part Three of this paper
undertakes an evaluation and analysis of whether some of those objectives
are being met, as well as some concluding thoughts. It is hoped that this
paper, with its review of the objectives supporting the creation of the court
of appeals, and its explanation of the past and present functions of the
supreme court, will provide the necessary groundwork for more definitive
future analyses of the effects of the court reorganization of 1977.
I.

A.

THE OBJECTIVES

The Supreme Court Priorto Court Reform: Its Functions
and Its Problems

Before the court of appeals was in place, I often compared our circumstances tantamount to being in a row boat not far above Niagara
Falls. We were rowing as hard and as fast as we could, but every
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moment the stem of the boat got closer and closer to the falls. It
was inevitable that one day our boat was going to go over.1
These concerns of Justice William G. Callow of the Wisconsin Supreme
Court were rooted in reality. The caseload was heavy and the consequences
were apparent.
The supreme court had increasingly been unable to cope with its
caseload. From 1962 to 1972, the number of cases disposed of increased
from 291 to 431. Simultaneously, the number of unfinished cases during
the same time period went from 40 to 335.2 During the 1974 term, docketed appeals including those pending from previous terms totaled 1,038
cases, a 180 percent increase over a fifteen year period.'
One consequence of this caseload was that a litigant had to wait eighteen to twenty-two months for a final disposition of his or her case.4 Justice
Roland B. Day of the Wisconsin Supreme Court remembers: "When I first
came on the court in 1974, we were two years behind in our work and
falling farther behind each month."' His observations are supported by the
statistics. In the 1973-1974 term of the supreme court, despite having written 408 opinions, which translates to five to six cases per month for each
justice, new filings had increased from 457 in the previous term to 611. The
number of cases carried over to the next term rose to 383, nearly a full
year's complement of cases.6 At that rate, the court was falling behind
nearly one full year every year.
The consequences of this delay were numerous. The quality of justice at
the trial court level was inconsistent.
There were county and circuit judges who recognized the difficulty
and the delay in taking an appeal to the supreme court. Some were
high-handed. They impliedly said, "This is the law in my court (not
the people's court) and if you don't like it take it to the supreme
court. You will wait two or three years and it will cost you a bundle." So there were some county and circuit judges who considered
themselves pretty much the ultimate law of the county or circuit. If,
1. Interview with Justice William G. Callow, Wisconsin Supreme Court, in Madison, Wisconsin (Jan. 11, 1988).
2. CITIZENS STUDY COMMITrEE ON JUDICIAL ORGANIZATION, REPORT TO GOVERNOR
PATRICK J. LUCEY, at 77 (Jan. 1973).
3. National Center for State Courts, WISCONSIN APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
STUDY, Pub. No. R0021, 1 (Dec. 1975).
4. CITIZENS STUDY COMMITTEE, supra note 2, at 77.
5. Interview with Justice Roland B. Day, Wisconsin Supreme Court, in Madison, Wisconsin
(Jan. 13, 1988).
6. Address by Chief Justice Horace W. Wilkie, Wisconsin Supreme Court, Joint Session of
the Wisconsin State Legislature, Madison, Wisconsin (Jan. 23, 1975).
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however, there was a court of appeals and a review in sixty or ninety
days, that judge would become considerably more thoughtful, considerably more reasonable, and considerably more law oriented.7
Justice Day, appointed to the supreme court in 1974, voiced a related
but somewhat different concern: "The delay probably produced more
forced settlements because everybody knew they were going to be sitting
around for at least two years and we kept slipping farther and farther behind. Justice delayed may not always be justice denied but it makes justice
irritating to say the least."'
What was the source of the difficulty? Justice Heffernan who has served
on the supreme court since 1964, supplied the answer:
Every litigant in the circuit court had a right to appeal from any
final judgment as a matter of right. This meant that no matter how
trivial the case, it could be appealed. And it seemed they usually
were. There was only one place for that appeal to be heard: the
Wisconsin Supreme Court.9
Something had to be done. Internally, the court considered a number of
alternatives, and did adopt some new procedures in an attempt to combat
the ever increasing caseload.
We toyed with the idea of having our court sit in panels of three
with either the Chief Justice presiding or some other presiding officer. We also thought of the possibility of having court commissioners sit as hearing officers and make recommendations to us as do the
U.S. magistrates. Another possibility was to add more members to
the court. We finally decided that we simply could not have every
case orally argued. We adopted a screening panel composed of three
justices on a rotating basis.1
In a memo to Chief Justice Heffernan, Supreme Court Commissioner
Joseph M. Wilson, appointed by the supreme court in 1972, described the
screening process:
The court was experiencing an increasing backlog in the appeals that
were pending and ready for disposition; the Commissioner's position
was created in an effort to deal with that growing backlog. Initially,
the screening decision was made by the entire court. The cases were
tracked onto either the oral argument calendar, the on-briefs calendar or the per curiam calendar. It quickly became apparent that
involving the entire court in the screening process was cumbersome
7. Interview with Justice Callow, supra note 1.
8. Interview with Justice Day, supra note 5.
9. Interview with Chief Justice Nathan S.Heffernan, Wisconsin Supreme Court, in Madison,
Wisconsin (Jan. 11, 1988).
10. Id.
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and counterproductive. Thus, a panel system was devised whereby
three justices, assigned on a rotation basis, would meet with the
commissioner and make the prescreening determinations. Those
cases assigned to the oral arguments' or on-briefs' calendar went to
the court for disposition. Those cases screened for the per curiam
calendar were then assigned to the commissioners for disposition.
The commissioner, after having prepared what was called a "calendar memo" for screening purposes, would then prepare a more elaborate and detailed "disposition memo" discussing the issues and
suggesting a disposition for the case. These memos were accompanied by a proposed per curiam opinion the commissioner had prepared for the court's approval. 1
Court Commissioner James Ward Rector, describing this screening process in an unpublished speech given in 1975, pointed out that in 1972, 437
cases were screened, an average of forty-four per ten month period. However, the first four months of the 1973 term averaged nearly sixty per
month. His speech concluded: "Pre-screening helps increase output by increasing input. However, there is a limit to the number of cases a court can
handle, regardless of the amount of input or increased efficiency. That limit
is rapidly being reached." 2
None of the measures were adequate to deal with the problem.
We tried these various stopgaps to handle the cases more efficiently.
It was only after trying all of these things and finding that none of
them really worked that we finally were convinced and we convinced
other people that there was no stopgap short1 of
a complete reorgani3
zation of the court that was going to work.
How did the caseload affect the fumctions of the court? The functions of
the court fell into several categories: case preparation and opinion writing;
review of colleagues' opinions; writing of dissents and concurrences; and
administration and supervision over the courts and the integrated bar. That
the ideal time available for these functions and the actual time available for
these functions were far apart is evident from the justices' responses with
respect to each of those functions.
1. Case Preparation and Opinion Writing
Writing opinions undoubtedly received the largest focus of each
justice simply because we had so many to write. Each judge was
11. Letter from Joseph M. Wilson to Chief Justice Heffeman (Dec. 14, 1987) (describing the
screening process).
12. Speech by Court Commissioner James Ward Rector, unknown date and place (1975).
13. Interview with Chief Justice Heffernan, supra note 9.
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writing at least four or five published opinions a month. There was a
year or two in which I wrote as many as 100 opinions. These were
not all published opinions, but they were full-length opinions.14
A number of the justices described the method in which cases were assigned, a method that received much criticism. Each month, twenty-eight
or thirty-five cases were assigned to the calendar for oral argument. A system of rotation was instituted whereby the cases were allocated, one out of
every seven to each justice. This was done prior to oral argument. Each
justice received four or five cases, depending on the amount due for oral
argument. Each justice's office prepared a lengthy bench memo on the
cases assigned to that office discussing the whole case, the facts, the legal
questions involved and recommendations as to how the case ought to be
decided. During the week after oral argument, the justice assigned to the
case augmented the memo, if necessary, and then distributed it to the other
justices. A decision conference was then held one week after oral argument.
The justice to whom the case was assigned would lead the discussion, giving
a summary of the case and recommendations as to the outcome of the case.
The case was discussed around the table and a vote taken with the assigned
justice voting first. Following the assigned justice's vote, the next vote was
given by a so-called "checker judge" who was seated immediately next to
the assigned justice. This "checker judge" rotated each month from one
side of the assigned justice to the other, and in theory had the responsibility
of overseeing the assigned justice's case. If the assigned justice's vote received a majority from the conference, he or she would write the opinion. If
the assigned justice was not in the majority, the first justice expressing the
view of the majority as the vote went around the table would be assigned
the opinion and one of his or her cases would be traded to the assigned
justice for writing. As discussed later in this paper, this process lent weight
to the concern that decisions were at times being rendered without full consideration and collegial decision-making by the entire court.
Every justice interviewed except one' 5 expressed the same conclusion
with respect to the amount of time available for case preparation and opinion writing. It was inadequate.

14. Id.

15. Justice Abrahamson said:
There is never enough time to do everything you might want to do. But I thought that the

cases that needed a lot of attention got it. Sometimes more, sometimes less. Sometimes
one judge thinks a case is a very important case that needs a lot of attention; another
disagrees and doesn't think it is that important. And, then you have traditions in a court
that affect how courts handle matters that have nothing to do with time.
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We were writing twenty-eight to thirty-five cases a month. We
would spend one week a month in oral argument. Another four
days would be spent in conference in order to discuss the cases, our
decisions and the circulated opinions. That left approximately fourteen days to write your own four to five opinions, review your colleagues' opinions, consider any dissents and concurrences, and
review administrative matters. It was a physical and mathematical
impossibility.16
Chief Justice Heffernan expressed the same concern:
I generally felt I had time to do a fairly decent first draft, though it
may have been a slap-dash effort. It frequently got the approval of
the court. I would say, however, that I never had an opportunity to
write an opinion and to just let it sit and mature and to take a second
look at it. I think none of us had the opportunity to do as good ajob
as we could have done now. 17
The consequences of a workload of four to five opinions a month rippled
through two other important functions of the collegial decision-making process: the review of colleagues' opinions and the writing of concurrences and
dissents.
2.

Review of Colleagues' Opinions

The fear expressed by the Citizens Study Committee (the committee is
discussed in detail in the next section) that decisions were being rendered in
many cases without full consideration by all members of the court, was
confirmed by a number of the justices.
We and the moon were on a twenty-eight day cycle. It started with
oral arguments and it ended the day before oral argument began.
We had great pressure that every opinion assigned to us be mandated on the first or second day of oral argument. I can remember I
was being critical of something one of my colleagues had written
when I had not been on the court too long and one of the other
justices that had been on longer got next to me and said "Rollie,
you are going to find out that you will have all you can do to take
care of your own opinions and not be worrying about everybody
else's opinions." That turned out to be fairly accurate ... unless
they came out with something bizarre you let18it go. There wasn't
time. You were grinding out your own stuff.
Interview with Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson, Wisconsin Supreme Court, in Madison, Wisconsin
(Jan. 22, 1988).
16. Interview with Justice Callow, supra note 1.
17. Interview with Chief Justice Heffernan, supra note 9.
18. Interview with Justice Day, supra note 5.
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Chief Justice Heffernan agreed:
We had so many cases that we were barely able to write the cases
that were assigned to us, let alone giving careful scrutiny to the opinions written by our colleagues. As I said when I urged the creation
of the court of appeals, many of our opinions were really one judge
opinions... although I don't want to overstate it, the opinion was
frequently one that was scrutinized with complete thoroughness
only by a single judge, perhaps another judge with our checking system .... I would look at the cases and if the opinion came out right,
affirm or reverse, and if there was no major problem presented on its
face, I would rather perfunctorily approve it. That is all you could
do when you had that many cases. We knew what the cases were
about; however, the nuances, the niceties, the discussion of what
should be done in a particular case, reflection, and what it presaged
for the future - all were done without sufficient collegial consideration. There was never an opportunity to discuss this fully with your
colleagues and rediscuss it because we just had too many cases to do.
We gave it all the time we could but I never felt that we had an
opportunity to exchange ideas as freely as I would have liked or to
the extent that we do now. 19
3.

Concurrences and Dissents

A 1971 article comparing supreme court decisions in North Carolina
before and after creation of a court of appeals pointed to the quantity and
quality of concurrences and dissents as being one indication reflecting quality of work product.2 0 It asserted that with the additional time available
and more important questions in the balance, a justice can be expected not
only to formulate his or her own conceptions of the case, but also to express
this conception in a concurring or dissenting opinion.
A summary comparison of three full terms of the supreme court in Wisconsin prior to the creation of the court of appeals and three full terms after
reveals the following data. The 1975, 1976 and 1977 terms resulted in a
total of 845 published opinions. Of those, sixty-nine full concurrences or
dissents were filed. The 1984, 1985 and 1986 terms resulted in a total of
241 published opinions. Of these, 115 full concurrences or dissents were
fied. Thus, in the three terms studied prior to the creation of court of
appeals, fewer than ten percent of the opinions produced alternative approaches to the law. In the three years studied after the advent of the court
19. Interview with Chief Justice Heffernan, supra note 9.
20. Groot, The Effects of an Intermediate Appellate Court on the Supreme Court Work Product: The North CarolinaExperience, 7 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 548 (1971).
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of appeals, nearly fifty percent of the opinions produced alternative approaches to the law. Another way of stating this is that in the three years
studied after the court of appeals was created, the number of opinions was
reduced to nearly one-quarter while the number of full dissents and concurrences nearly doubled.
Why did fewer than ten percent of the published opinions attract an
articulated alternative approach to the law expressed in the majority opinion? The answer was supplied by the justices - inadequate time.
Chief Justice Heffernan stated: "[Y]ou did not have much opportunity
for new research on concurrences and dissents. We would have an opinion
conference on Friday. On Friday you would announce whether you had a
dissent. You were expected to have it circulated the following Monday."2 1
Justice Callow put it nearly the same way:
Because of the large number of cases, one had to be very highly
motivated almost to the point of being appalled at the majority opinion before you would take the time to write a dissent. If you did,
there was insufficient time to write as thorough and as scholarly a
dissent as it should be to expose the public to the alternative reasoning that prompted it. The same held true for concurring opinions.2"
4.

Conclusions

The comments of the justices who served prior to the creation of the
court of appeals were echoed in the concerns expressed by the committees
that made recommendations to the legislature concerning court reorganization. There were too many cases, delays resulted, and there was little time
for concurrences or dissents. Whether the quality of the decisions suffered
whether the "law-developing" function of the court (as opposed to the
"case-deciding" function) suffered - I leave for others to judge. The conclusion appears almost inescapable, however, that a diminution of quality
was an inevitable consequence. Something needed to be done, and it was.
B.

The History of the EnablingLegislation

"[T]he improvement of the administration ofjustice is not for the shortwinded." 23 Thus prophetically spoke Chief Justice E. Harold Hallows of
the Wisconsin Supreme Court at the Wisconsin judiciary meeting in January of 1971.
21. Interview with Chief Justice Heffernan, supra note 9.
22. Interview with Justice Callow, supra note 1.
23. Hallows, The Casefor an Intermediate Appellate Court, 44 Wis. B. BULL. 15, 24 (Apr.
1971).
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Public awareness of the need for reorganization of the judicial branch of
government had been growing for some time. The entire system appeared
to need an administrative overhaul. However, the debate surrounding court
reform tended to center around the particular problem of work overload in
the supreme court. Patrick J. Lucey, as a successful candidate for governor
in 1970, supported creation of an intermediate appellate court.24
In his speech at the Wisconsin judiciary meeting in 1971, Hallows continued the process of alerting the public to the problems of supreme court
overload. Notwithstanding a work output record well above the national
average for state supreme courts, the court was falling further and further
behind. In its 1968-1969 term, the court had to defer ninety-four appeals to
the following term. In its 1969-1970 term, it had to defer 138 appeals, despite having published 293 cases, a workload of over forty-four cases per
justice. In its 1968-1969 term, the court issued, in addition to its opinions,
169 unpublished opinions. In the 1969-1970 term, the number of unpublished opinions rose to 249 despite new efforts to handle post conviction
criminal remedies in the trial courts. "At this rate," Hallows said in 1971,
"and before a few more years have passed, an appeal will not be reached for
argument for a year after it is ready for argument, or approximately one
and one-half years after the appeal is taken."25
Hallows did not have to wait long to see his worst expectations come
true. In January of 1975, Hallows' successor, Horace W. Wilkie, appeared
before the Wisconsin Legislature seeking its support for court reform, and
specifically its support for creation of an intermediate court of appeals.
Hallows' prediction of a year and a half wait was now fact. "After an appeal is taken to our court, it normally takes about six months to perfect the
record and to file the briefs of counsel. After this is accomplished, the average civil litigant must wait for approximately a year for his cause to be
considered and decided by our court." 26 The filings had grown even more
numerous, and consequently, the cases carried over from term to term had
increased precipitously.
During the 1973 term our court wrote 408 opinions, 25% more than
just two years ago.., new filings in the same period went from 457
to 611, a growth of 33% ... the cases carried over to the next term
went.., to 383 in this past year, an increase of 162% 27

24. Id. at 16.
25. Id. at 15.
26. Wilkie, supra note 6.

27. Id.
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Thus, in just the few short years from 1971 to 1975, carry-over cases
had gone from 138 to 383. Chief Justice Wilkie must have yearned for the
days of Hallows' tenure.
Following Hallows' speech, one of the state's major newspapers, in a
seven part editorial series in February 1971 entitled Making Our Courts
Work, spearheaded the media support for a complete overhaul of the
system.
The judicial branch of government in Wisconsin is in trouble ....
Timid halting patchwork - a few new rules, a few new courts won't repair it. The trouble is pervasive. It ranges through all the
aspects of judicial selection, structure, administration, procedure,
ethics and discipline. Only thorough drastic overhaul, including
constitutional change, can restore competency and efficiency.2 8
In its editorial series, the Milwaukee Journal pointed out several specific
problem areas that needed reform, starting with the creation of an intermediate court of appeals.
To begin at the top, the State Supreme Court, despite its long record
of diligence, can no longer keep up with its workload. The steady
rise in this backlog of deferred decisions is irreversible under present
arrangements. It is forced, even so, to scrimp on the time required
for top quality decision making and opinion writing.2 9
Both Hallows and the Milwaukee Journal editorial series called for the
institution of a study committee.
I think the most hopeful approach to a solution to the overall problem would be the creation of a high-level blue-ribbon committee of
high-minded citizens, independent of the three branches of the state
government - yet having their cooperation, a committee adequately
staffed and with financial resources for research and expert
assistance.3 °
What they got was not just one study committee, but three: a Legislative Council Report to the 1973 Legislature on Court Reorganization; a
Citizens Study Committee on Judicial Organization; and a Wisconsin Appellate Practice and Procedure Study (WAPP) done by the National Center
for State Courts.
The first study was done under auspices of the Legislative Council.3 1 At
its March 16, 1970 meeting, the Legislative Council directed that an advi28. Milwaukee Journal, Feb. 7, 1971, § 5, at 2, col.
29. Id.
30. Hallows, supra note 23, at 25.
31. The Legislative Council is an agency of the state legislature. It is composed of six members of the joint committee on legislative organization; the senate and assembly chairpersons; the
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sory committee be appointed to study court reorganization. Although the
Committee had its initial meeting on May 14, 1970, its long range focus did
not begin until after Chief Justice Hallows' speech in January of 1971. Altogether, the Committee held twenty meetings and completed its work at its
December 16, 1971 meeting. 2
The second study was the Citizens Study Committee on Judicial Organization. It was established by Governor Patrick J. Lucey on April 23, 1971,
by his Executive Order No. 13.33 His charge was put in the broadest possible terms:
The Committee shall investigate the adequacy and efficiency of the
present judicial system in the State of Wisconsin, and shall make
recommendations to my office on suggested changes in the operations, organization, procedures, judicial selections, and any other
matter which might be germane to the improved efficiency of Wisconsin's judicial system.3 4
John C. Geilfuss of Milwaukee was made its chairman. The membership of
the committee consisted of forty citizen members, all appointed by the governor. Fourteen were practicing attorneys, four were with the two Wisconsin law schools, and others had backgrounds in business, labor, law
enforcement, social work, journalism and accounting."
A predominant portion of the Committee was not in any direct or financial manner associated with the judicial system of Wisconsin. By design, no
judges or legislators were included on the Committee, but the Committee
liberally solicited their testimony and expectations as required. 36 The Committee, working in five subcommittees, completed its work in December of
1972 and submitted its report to the governor in January of 1973.
The third study was commissioned by the supreme court itself. "The
court decided that the entire appellate process of Wisconsin should be examined by an independent team of experts to find ways to expedite the handling of cases while preserving traditional values of collegiality and
deliberation."' 37 This study was the only one of the three to concentrate
solely on the appeal process. The court assigned the study to the National
ranking minority member of the joint committee on finance; the assembly speaker pro tern; and
three senators and five representatives appointed as standing committees in each house. THE
STATE OF WISCONSIN 1975 BLUE BOOK 292 (1975).
32. WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, Report to the 1973 Legislature on Court Reorganiza-

tion (Mar. 1973).
33. CITIZENS STUDY COMMITTEE, supra note 2, at 257.

34. Id.
35. Id. at 11.
36. Id.
37. WISCONSIN APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE STUDY, supra note 3, at 3.
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Center for State Courts in March of 1975. An advisory committee under
the chairmanship of Justice Nathan S. Heffernan of the Wisconsin Supreme
Court was appointed to work with the center. A project review committee
was also appointed consisting of Professor Daniel J. Meador, University of
Virginia Law School; Justice Winslow Christian, California Court of Appeals; Robert D. Lipscher, Circuit Executive for the Second Federal Circuit; and Edward B. McConnell, Director of the National Center for State
Courts. The final study was submitted to the court in December of 1975.
All these studies were unanimous in their conclusion recommending the
creation of an intermediate appeals court. The Legislative Council Committee, in its Report to the 1973 Legislature on Court Reorganization, recognized the growing caseload in the supreme court:
During the past few terms, the court has been faced with a growing
backlog of cases. The seriousness of the present backlog is indicated
by the growth in the number of cases continued or carried over to
the following term. According to JudicialStatistics, now published
annually by the Administrator of Courts and formerly published by
the Judicial Council, 304 cases were continued to the 1972 term and
209 cases were continued to the 1971 term while, by contrast, only
72 cases were continued to the 1967 term.3"
The report also indicated what the Committee perceived to be the source of
the problem: "There is a statutory right of appeal to the supreme court in
practically every type of case, which means that the court has no practical
method by which it can limit its workload." 3 9
The WAPP Study stated that the supreme court was confronted with an
unmanageable caseload, resulting in intolerable delays. It envisioned the
court of appeals as the final arbiter of most trial court decisions. The role of
the supreme court would be primarily to "formulate and develop common
law, resolve issues of great public importance and constitutional questions,
and to supervise the judicial system of the state."'
The Citizens Study Committee made the most far reaching, and in retrospect, most influential recommendations. First proposed by Chief Justice
Hallows in his 1971 speech to the judiciary, then subsequently created by
the governor with a membership consisting of a wide array of highly
respected Wisconsin citizens, the Citizens Study Committee had by far the
greatest impact on court reorganization in Wisconsin. Senator James

38. Wis. LEGIS. COUNCIL, supra note 32, at 5.
39. Id.
40. WISCONSIN APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE STUDY, supra note 3, at 68.
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Flynn, chairperson of the Special Legislative Committee that dealt with the
subject of court reorganization, spoke of its importance:
I relied heavily on the Citizens Study Committee Report, most particularly during the initial considerations of the constitutional
amendments. That committee identified the problems. The voters
confirmed the existence of the problems. During legislative consideration of the bills, I looked at the Citizens Committee Report as a
The Legislative
broad schematic, a framework for a justice system.
41
Council staff and our committee fleshed it out.
Attorney Daniel Fernbach was the Staff Director for the Special Legislative Committee that drafted SB 525. He also confirmed the importance of
the Citizens Study Committee.
Without doubt, it was the first trumpet for court reorganization. Its
report had great credibility with the legislature because of its broad
membership - not just attorneys or judges who had their own interests. It brought home to the legislature what was needed and had
considerable influence on those of us who worked with the Special
Legislative Committee in drawing up the Bill.4 2
The Citizens Study Committee on Judicial Organization prefaced its
recommendation to create an intermediate court of appeals by stating what
the committee felt were the basic functions of an appellate court structure:
First, appellate review should act as a check on arbitrary decisions
by the trial court .... Second, it should provide a "second look" at
decisions made during the course of trial when there is often too
little time for adequate research and contemplation . . . . Third,
appellate review must serve a "law-stating" function by cogently articulating the law in areas where there is confusion or an incomplete
statement.4 3
In addition, the committee pointed out that appeals should be reasonably
available with a minimum of delay and must not be prohibitively
expensive. 44
In discussing the problem of the appellate structure existing at that
time, the committee started by pointing out that all appeals from the circuit
and county courts (with some limited exceptions) went to the supreme
court and that the workload on the supreme court had increased dramatically to the point where the court was unable to cope with its increased
workload. In 1973, the court wrote 408 opinions, better than fifty-eight
41.
42.
43.
44.

Interview with State Senator James Flynn, in Madison, Wisconsin (Dec. 30, 1987).
Interview with Daniel Fernbach, in Madison, Wisconsin (Jan. 5, 1988).
CITIZENS STUDY COMMITTEE, supra note 2, at 78.
Id. at 82.
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cases per justice or approximately five to six cases per month per justice for
the ten month term. 5 The size of this workload concerned the Citizens
Study Committee.
The magnitude of the workload on justices of the Wisconsin court
can easily be seen by comparison to other high courts. It has been
noted that justices of the United States Supreme Court, a true
supreme court in the sense that it deals with cases of real precedential value, write only twelve to fifteen opinions per year and have the
assistance of a full staff of law clerks. Several state supreme courts,
on the other hand, demand thirty-five to forty opinions per justice.4 6
In the judgment of the committee the overload of appeals in the
supreme court created a number of deficiencies in the Wisconsin appellate
system:
1) The problem of delay, and the resultant hardship on those litigants
who must wait eighteen to twenty-two months for a final disposition of their
cases.
Moreover, it has been noted that delay breeds delay: Once an appellate case backlog has been established, the filing rate appears to increase, leading to the inference that some appeals are being filed for
tactical reasons that delay can be used to improve the bargaining
position of the party appealing.4 7
2) The sacrifice of quality for quantity.
In the rush to cope with its ever-increasing calendar, the supreme
court must invariably sacrifice quality for quantity. Increasing appellate backlogs necessarily produce a dilution in craftsmanship ....
Moreover, a decrease in the quality of appellate decisions caused by
case backlogs produces even greater backlogs. Terse or incomplete
opinions create uncertainty as to the case law and encourage more
litigation. Cases of major precedential value may not receive the
thorough research and consideration they require. The supreme
court is cast in the role of a "case-deciding court" - one which
merely reacts to individual cases and thus slights its law-stating
function.48
3) The inability to exercise proper administrative and supervisory leadership over the trial courts and the integrated bar.4 9
4) The concern that there was inadequate time for a collegial decision
in all cases.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Wilkie, supra note 6.
CrrIzENS STUDY COMMITEE, supra note 2, at 78.

Id.
Id.

49. Id.
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Decisions may be rendered in many cases without full consideration
by all members of the court. Because of the press of business, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court follows a practice of assigning cases to
individual justices prior to oral argument. In theory, each justice
should read the briefs in each case and participate fully in its determination. In practice, this may not be possible and there may not be
adequate time for a collegial decision in all cases.50
The committee, in recommending the creation of a court of appeals,
articulated five objectives that it hoped would result from the creation of a
court of appeals:
First, it would substantially reduce the supreme court caseload.
Second, it would decrease the time between appeal and final determination of a case.
Third, it would allow the supreme court to function collegially
by having a sufficient amount of time for discussion, research, and
review, thereby insuring the best quality of decisions.
Fourth, it would allow the supreme court sufficient time to
devote to its law-stating function - the formulation and articulation
of a coherent body of jurisprudence.
Fifth, it would allow the supreme court to administer and supervise all state courts and the integrated state bar. 1
In order to reach these objectives, the committee recommended that the
court of appeals should have exclusive jurisdiction over all appeals, with
two exceptions. It argued that there should be no right of appeal from the
court of appeals' decision and that the court of appeals should be the court
of last resort for the vast majority of cases. It stated that it was absolutely
imperative that the supreme court have discretion as to which cases it
would accept.
Otherwise, the judicial system would constantly be faced with a
specter of double appeals, the expense and delay of the appellate process would be magnified rather than reduced, and the court of appeals would become nothing more than an "intermediate appellate
court" or "bus-stop" en route to the supreme court.52
In all important respects, the recommendations made by these committees were adopted in the proposed amendments to the Wisconsin Constitution and the subsequent enabling legislation.
The reorganization of the judiciary could not be accomplished without
amending the Wisconsin Constitution. This required that the proposed
50. Id.
51. Id.

52. Id.
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amendments be agreed to by each house of the legislature in two consecutive sessions. Following such agreement, the proposed amendments were
then submitted to the vote of the people.53
This process of amending the Wisconsin Constitution to provide for
court reorganization began on January 23, 1975, when 1975 Assembly Joint
Resolution 11 (AJR 11) was introduced. It was passed by the Assembly on
September 24, 1975, when AJR 11 was read a third time and sent to the
Senate. 4 After some skirmishes between the two houses and the appointment of a conference committee, AJR 11 was finally passed by both houses
on February 26, 1976.' The 1977 session of the legislature saw the second
consideration of the proposed amendment. It took the form of Senate Joint
Resolution 9, which was in all essential forms the same proposal as contained in AJR 11 of the 1975 session. Introduced on January 18, 1977, it
passed both houses within a month, on February 17, 1977.56
In April 1977, the proposed amendments17 were submitted to the people
for ratification. The amendments were overwhelmingly adopted by a vote
of 455,350 to 229,316.8 All that remained to be done was the enabling
legislation.
The Legislative Council created a special committee on court reorganization to draft enabling legislation for the creation of a court of appeals.
Chaired by Senator James Flynn of West Allis, the special committee
drafted and introduced Senate Bill 525 which was enacted by the legislature
in a special session in November of 1977 as ch. 187, Laws of 1977, and
subsequently incorporated into Wisconsin Statutes as ch. 752. The court of
appeals was sworn in on August 1, 1978. How its creation drastically
changed the functions of the supreme court is the subject of the following
section.
II. THE PRESENT FUNCTIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT
That the work of the supreme court has changed quite drastically since
the creation of the court of appeals is apparent to any close observer of the
court. However, before any reasonable judgment can be made as to
whether the objectives motivating the creation of the court of appeals are
53. See Wis. CONsT. art. XII, § 1.
54. Bulletin of the Proceedings of the Wisconsin Legislature, 553-56 (1975).
55. Id. at 556.
56. Bulletin of the Proceedingsof the Wisconsin Legislature,Senate, 374-75 (1977).
57. For a complete wording of the amendments, see Laws of Wisconsin, 1977, Senate Joint
Resolution 9, at 891-92.
58. THE STATE OF WISCONSIN 1977 BLUE BOOK 868-69 (1977).
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being met, it is necessary to have a full understanding of how the supreme
court has functioned since the creation of the court of appeals.
The overall work of the supreme court can be broken down into three
separate functions. The first function which I will refer to as the Initial
Review Function is the court's role in reviewing petitions to review, certifications from the court of appeals and by-passes filed by one or both of the
parties. This is the initial determination made by the court sitting in conference to accept or deny a case for full review. Full review, with rare exception, entails oral argument and published opinion. The Initial Review
Function is an entirely new function since the creation of the court of appeals. It was not a function of the court prior to that time, simply because
all appeals from final judgment in the trial court came to the supreme court
as a matter of right. The supreme court had no choice but to accept each
appeal.
The second function which I will refer to as the Opinion Function is the
decision-making process of the court with respect to cases that have been
accepted for full review. It includes preparation for oral argument, oral
argument, opinion writing, review of colleagues' opinions, and dissents and
concurrences.
The third function is the court's administrative and supervisory role
over all of the courts and the integrated bar. As will be seen in further
discussion of this role, the administrative and supervisory function of the
court has increased substantially since the creation of the court of appeals.
A.

InitialReview Function

We brought to our decision and to the legislature and the Governor's committee some very carefully thought out ideas which were
formed over a long period of time. The most basic thing we decided
was that our court was to be a full certiorari court with absolute
discretion in accepting cases for review.5 9
The discretionary power of the supreme court is reflected in Article VII,
Section 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution:
(1) The supreme court shall have superintending power and administrative authority over all courts.
(2) The supreme court has appellate jurisdiction over all courts and
may hear original actions and proceedings. The supreme court may
issue all writs necessary in aid of its jurisdiction.

59. Interview with Chief Justice Heffernan, supra note 9.
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(3) The supreme court may review judgments and orders of the
court of appeals, may remove cases from the court of appeals and
may accept cases on certification by the court of appeals. °
Approximately 700 times a year, the court is asked to exercise its discretion and accept a case for full review. Prior to the creation of the court of
appeals, this was not a function of the supreme court. It simply had to
accept any appeal taken from final judgment in the trial court. Thus, no
time was expended in determining whether to accept an appeal. That is not
the case today. The court has absolute discretion in deciding whether to
accept a case for full review. Thus, the initial decision as to whether to
accept a case has taken on critical significance in the decision-making process of the court. If the court denies a petition for review, that case is concluded. Approximately 675 petitions to review are filed yearly of which
approximately ninety percent are denied. Should the court deny a certification or a by-pass request, the result is not nearly as final. Those cases then
are heard by the court of appeals whose decision may or may not be appealed by one of the litigants filing a petition for review. Approximately
forty certifications are fied yearly, of which about sixty-six percent are accepted. Approximately forty by-passes are filed yearly, of which about
twenty percent are accepted. 6 '
The procedure by which the court deals with the petitions to review,
certifications and by-passes rarely varies. 62 Upon filing in the clerk's office,
the petitions are forwarded to one of three court commissioners for analysis. Within sixty days, the commissioner to whom the case is assigned
prepares and circulates to the court a memorandum containing a thorough
analysis and a recommendation. Along with the memorandum, the commissioner delivers to each justice the petition itself and the briefs that have
been filed supporting or opposing the request. Thus, the complete packet
delivered to each justice for each case contains a six to ten page commissioner's memo, the petition, one or two briefs approximately twenty to
thirty pages in length, and an appendix containing the decision(s) of the
court(s) below.
The court meets twice each month to review the petitions, certifications,
and by-passes. The court considers approximately sixty to seventy of these
requests each month. Each file is dealt with separately. A petition for re-

60. Wis. CONST. art. VII, § 3 (emphasis added).
61. Statistics provided by Marilyn Graves, Clerk of the Wisconsin Supreme Court.
62. For a complete description of this procedure, see INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES,
WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT 4-6 (1986).
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view is granted upon the affirmative vote of three justices. Certification and
by-passes are granted upon the affirmative vote of four justices.
How important do the justices perceive this function of initial review?
Most justices echoed Justice Louis Ceci's comment: "Petitions to review
are, along with opinion writing, the most important work that63we do. Once
we have voted to deny a review that is the end of the case.",
The importance that the justices place on the initial review function is
confirmed by the amount of time each reportedly spends on it. On average,
each justice indicated that three and one-half to five days a month are spent
on this function. 64
B.

Opinion Function

There are five collegial discussions, that is, five full reviews with everybody on the court, for every case that we finally decide. We have
it on the petition for review. We have it on the preargument conference. We have it at the oral argument where there is a give and take,
a collegial interchange in a sense. [We] have the immediate postdecisional conference in which [we] discuss what the tentative results will be. [We] end up with a post-opinion conference, at least
one, usually more than one, determining what the decision of the
court is going to be. So [we] have five opportunities for a collegial
65
interchange of ideas and more if anybody wants to reconference it.
The Opinion Function is the decision-making process of the court with
respect to cases that have been accepted for full review. It includes preparation for oral arguments, oral arguments, opinion writing, review of colleagues' opinions, and the writing of concurrences and dissents. Most
justices indicated that they spend approximately fifteen to nineteen days a
month on this function.
With rare exception, cases that have been accepted for full review are
placed on the oral argument calendar. Oral argument is normally during
63. Interview with Justice Louis J. Ceci, Wisconsin Supreme Court, in Madison, Wisconsin
(Jan. 7, 1988).
64. Justice Abrahamson indicated:
I do petitions to review in what I call dead time.., when I can't be in the library and I
can't be next to a word processor and have a lot of materials sorted out for writing and
research. So, I do petitions when I can carry them with me. I'm being driven somewhere,
or I'm at home. I do them late at night and early in the morning. So, I don't spend days at
it. I try and do petitions between things. So it is piecemeal. I suppose it must take somewhere between an hour to two hours on each petition if you are going to give [it] a thorough treatment.
Interview with Justice Abrahamson, supra note 15.
65. Interview with Chief Justice Heffernan, supra note 9.
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the first week of every month from September through June. Seven to fourteen cases are normally scheduled every month, depending on the number
of reviews that have been accepted. Each justice receives the briefs for the
cases about one month prior to oral argument. Legal memoranda are prepared by each office thoroughly analyzing the factual and legal issues
presented.
At 9 a.m. on each day of oral argument, the court meets in conference
to discuss the cases scheduled for argument that day. Each justice has been
randomly assigned one of the cases for the purpose of leading the discussion of that case both at the preargument and the postargument conference.
At the preargument conference, the court discusses the issues, determines
what has not been adequately presented by the parties in their briefs and
determines what the parties should address at argument.6 6
Following each day's oral arguments, the court again meets in conference to discuss, tentatively decide and assign each case argued that day to a
justice for writing. Cases are assigned for writing by lot to a justice who has
voted with the majority in the tentative decision of the case. Thus, unlike
the system that existed prior to the creation of the court of appeals,
whereby the members knew prior to oral argument who would write the
opinion in most cases, the justices under the present system do not know
until after a tentative decision has been made who will write for the court.
Once the opinion has been written, it is circulated to all members of the
court for review at least forty-eight hours prior to the opinion conference.
During the fourth week of each month, usually Friday, an opinion conference is held at which the court discusses the circulated opinions. Opinions
may also be discussed at other conferences held during the month. After
consideration, if there are any changes to be made that are of more than
minimal importance, an opinion is recirculated and reconferenced. Any
justice who elects to write a concurrence or a dissent must complete it and
circulate it prior to circulating his or her assigned opinions that have not
been completed. Once the concurring or dissenting opinion is circulated,
the entire case is reconferenced. It is not an altogether rare occurrence that
a dissenting opinion attracts sufficient votes to become a majority. This
requires that the dissent be rewritten as a majority opinion and reconferenced. Once an opinion and the dissents or concurrences are approved by
all members of the court, it is mandated promptly.6 7
66. See INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES, supra note 62, at 11.
67. Id. at 12-16.
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C. Administrative and Supervisory Function
"The supreme court shall have superintending and administrative authority over all courts."6 8
"When I first came on the court, we spent little time on matters of discipline and rulemaking. Disciplinary matters (over the bar) have become
much more time consuming. Rulemaking has become more time
consuming.""
The size of the bar has almost doubled since I came to the court.
There have to be more than twice as many discipline cases now than
there were in 1977-1978. It seems at almost every conference matters of discipline are the subject of some discussion and court attention. There were far fewer petitions for rule changes then. The State
Bar has substantially expanded its activities in the education, discipline and administrative fields. All of these fall upon us to make
rules.7 °
Administrative duties were a very minute, very small matter. I cannot recall a lawyer discipline case coming up. This was a rare thing.
Now every month we get a few of them. We have so many more
administrative matters. Look at the amount of time we spend on
lawyer discipline, on judicial discipline, on ethics codes and on procedural rules.7 1
These and other comments from the justices reflect that from their perspective the amount of time spent by the court on administrative matters
has greatly increased. 7' The justices indicated that administrative and supervisory duties consume at least two and one-half to three days a month.
Attorney discipline cases have increased substantially. From an average
of about ten lawyer discipline cases a year in 1973, 1974 and 1975 (nine, five
and fourteen respectively), the court now considers an average of about
forty a year.73 The number of lawyer discipline cases considered from 1981
to 1987 are as follows:
68. WIS. CONST. art. VII, § 3.
69. Interview with Justice Donald W. Steinmetz, Wisconsin Supreme Court, in Madison,
Wisconsin (Jan. 12, 1988).
70. Interview with Justice Callow, supra note 1.
71. Interview with Justice Day, supra note 5.
72. Justice Abrahamson expressed a somewhat different viewpoint:
I can't tell you whether it is more or less but prior to my coming on the court, the court did
a tremendous amount - rules of evidence - and other big codes. So, I think it depends
on your focus. If you took a long view of the court I think you would find that maybe
since the 60's, (and again, maybe I'm just wrong,) this court has been very active administratively. So I don't know whether we have gotten more or less.
Interview with Justice Abrahamson, supra note 15.
73. See supra note 61.
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1981:
1982:
1983:

34
33
49

1984:
43
1985:
37
1986:
33
1987:
31
Per curiam opinions in judicial and attorney disciplinary cases are prepared either by an individual justice or by the assistant to the chief justice
for the court's consideration. The per curiam opinions are all conferenced
by the entire court, and, when necessary, reconferenced prior to issuance.
The court's responsibility in the administration and supervision of the
bench and bar extends to many other areas, listed more fully below.7 4 The
court holds one or more public hearings on most of these matters, confer74. Matters concerning supreme court administration that have consumed significant portions of court time and attention in recent years include:
Code of Judicial Ethics revision (pending).
Revision of Rules and Procedures concerning the Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility and disciplinary proceedings (pending).
Bar Admission Rules, including moral character requirement and foreign license admission
(pending).
Rules of Professional Conduct of Attorneys:
In the Matter of the Amendment of Supreme Court Rules: SCR Chapter 20, Code of Professional Responsibility; SCR 11.01, 11.05, 11.08, 13.03, 13.04, 21.02 and 21.05; Modification of
SCR Chapter 31: Continuing Legal Education, 139 Wis. 2d xii (1987) (adopted June 10, 1987,
effective January 1, 1988).
Teleconferencing Rules of Procedure
In the Matter of the Amendment of Rules of Civil, Criminal and Appellate Procedure: Proceedings by Telephone and Audio-Visual Means, 141 Wis. 2d xxi (1987) (adopted October 30,
1987, effective January 1, 1988).
Revision of Continuing Legal Education Rules:
In the Matter of the Amendment of Supreme Court Rules Chapter 30 and 31: Continuing
Legal Education, 131 Wis. 2d xviii (1987) (adopted July 1, 1986, effective January 1, 1987).
State Bar:
(a) Dues reductionfor legislativeactivities:
In the Matter of the Amendment of State Bar Rules: SCR 10.03(5) - Member Dues Reduction, 127 Wis. 2d xi (1986) (adopted January 21, 1986, effective July 1, 1986).
(b) Dues referendum:
In the Matter of the Review of the State Bar Dues Increase, 136 Wis. 2d 546, 407 N.W.2d 228
(1987) (filed March 9, 1987). In the Matter of the 1987 State Bar Dues Referendum, 139 Wis. 2d
847, 407 N.W.2d 919 (1987) (filed June 26, 1987).
Interest on Trust Accounts Program (IOLTA):
In the Matter of the Creation of SCR Chapter 13 and Amendment of SCR 11.05 and SCR
20.50: Interest on Trust Accounts Program, 128 Wis. 2d xiii (1986) (adopted March 21, 1986,
effective March 21, 1986).
Plea Agreements:
In the Matter of the Amendment of Rules of Civil & Criminal Procedure: Sections 971.07 &
971.08, Stats., 128 Wis. 2d 422, 383 N.W.2d 496 (1986).
Felony Sentencing Guidelines:
In the Matter of Judicial Administration: Felony Sentencing Guidelines, 120 Wis. 2d 198, 353
N.W.2d 793 (1984).
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ences them both prior to and subsequent to the hearings, and approves
them as to form and substance prior to issuance.75
III.

EVALUATION, ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

Have the objectives supporting the creation of the court of appeals been
realized? If so, to what extent?
The concerns surrounding the creation of the court of appeals centered
on the workload of the supreme court and the effects the workload had on
the appellate process. The architects of the court reform sought to achieve
five objectives with respect to those concerns: 1) substantially reduce the
supreme court caseload; 2) decrease the time between filing the appeal and
final determination of the cases; 3) allow the court to function collegially
by having a sufficient amount of time for discussion, research, and review,
thereby ensuring the best quality of opinions; 4) allow the court sufficient
time to devote to its law-stating, law-developing function as opposed to a
case-deciding or error-correcting function; and 5) allow the court ample
time to adequately administer and supervise the bar and the courts.
It was hoped that the creation of the court of appeals, together with the
granting of absolute discretion in the supreme court with respect to invoking its jurisdiction, would greatly alleviate, if not resolve, all of these
concerns.
As stated previously, the purpose of this paper is to determine whether
some of these objectives have been met. The questions of whether the quality of the decisions has improved and whether the court is acting primarily
as a law-stating, law-developing court, are questions I leave to others. Both
are elusive concepts, the "stuff" of which law review articles are made. Nor
are these questions ones that a member of the court can objectively answer.
I invite others to do so. Answers with respect to the other objectives are not
so elusive.
A.

Caseload Overview

Approximately 700 cases are filed each year in the supreme court and
approximately the same number of cases are disposed of each year by the
court. Although this number does not deviate substantially from the total
number of cases filed prior to the creation of the court of appeals, most of
the cases filed then were disposed of by a full written opinion. It was that
time consuming task that led to delay and to the concerns regarding qual75. For other matters also considered by the court, including petitions for writs and motions,
see INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES, supra note 62, at 7-10.
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ity, lack of collegiality and inadequate time for administrative and supervisofy leadership. Today, a case is disposed of either by full written opinion
or a denial of the request to accept jurisdiction - a petition for review, a
certification from the court of appeals, or a petition to by-pass the court of
appeals filed by one or both of the parties. As the following data show,
approximately twelve to fifteen percent of the 700 cases a year that are filed
result in a full written opinion. The remaining cases are denied review.
For purposes of this paper, statistics from the four years of 1984, 1985,
1986 and 1987 were reviewed. 76 The figures for those years are:
Petitions to Review
# Filed
# Granted
# Denied
1984:
620
60
567
1985:
670
66
536
1986:
680
80
622
1987:
672
55
601
Certifications
1984:
46
19
25
1985:
47
23
24
1986:
29
20
12
1987:
33
18
13
By-Passes
1984:
52
9
41
1985:
44
9
41
1986:
34
3
28
1987:
39
8
30
A summary of the above tables indicates that the number of petitions,
certifications and by-passes that resulted in full written opinions each year
is:
1984:
88
1985:
98
1986: 103
1987:
81
These numbers, however, do not paint a complete picture of the number
of full written opinions that are written. The court, in its supervisory role
over the courts and the integrated bar, must review and decide judicial and
bar disciplinary actions. The total number of disciplinary cases reviewed in
the years studied, all of which resulted in a full published opinion by the
court, is:
1984:
44
1985:
37
76. See supra note 61.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:1

1986:
33
1987:
31
In addition to the above cases requiring full written opinions, a number
of other cases are given review which also require written opinions such as
when the court invokes its original jurisdiction. Thus, a complete summary
of full written opinions for the years described is:
1984: 145
1985: 122
1986:
94
1987: 116
The reason why the number of opinions has been reduced from five to
six cases per month per justice to one to two cases per month per justice is
obvious. Although the court receives as many appeals, or more, as it did
prior to the creation of the court of appeals, the court no longer must accept
every case. As a result of court reform, the court is a full certiorari court
with complete discretion. It is now free to choose those cases for full review
that it perceives meet the criteria of section 809.62(1) of the Wisconsin Statutes, which states, in part:
The following, while neither controlling nor fully measuring the
court's discretion, indicate criteria that will be considered:
(a) [Whether] a real and significant question of federal or state constitutional law is presented.
(b) [Whether] the petition for review demonstrates a need for the
supreme court to consider establishing, implementing or changing a
policy within its authority.
(c) [Whether] a decision by the supreme court will help develop,
clarify or harmonize the law, and
1. [Whether] the case calls for the application of a new doctrine
rather than merely the application of well-settled principles to the
factual situation; or
2. [Whether] the question presented is a novel one, the resolution of which will have statewide impact; or
3. [Whether] the question presented is not factual in nature but
rather is a question of law of the type that is likely to recur unless
resolved by the supreme court.
(d) [Whether] the court of appeals' decision is in conflict with controlling opinions of the United States Supreme Court or the supreme
court or other court of appeals' decisions.
(e) [Whether] the court of appeals' decision is in accord with opinions of the supreme court or the court of appeals but due to the
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passage of time or changing circumstances, such opinions are ripe
for reexamination.7 7
These criteria reflect the legislative concerns that the court act primarily as
a law-stating, law-developing court, not an error-correcting or case-deciding court.
It is clear that the first objective, reducing the caseload, has been met,
even though the number of cases appealed to the supreme court remains
approximately the same. Although the general concern was with the
number of cases, the specific concern centered on the fact that each case
appealed to the supreme court required a full written opinion. That is not
so today.
What is the result of the reduced number of opinions that are required
of each justice? As the rest of this paper details more fully, the result has
been substantially less delay in final resolution of appeals, greater collegiality in the consideration of cases, and a greater amount of time available to
devote to the court's administrative and supervisory responsibilities. In addition, the court now must spend three to five days a month in its initial
review function reviewing all the requests for the court to accept appeals
from the lower courts, a function that must be exercised with great care if
the court is to be something other than merely a case-deciding or errorcorrecting court. Each of these results will be discussed in turn.
B.

Length of Time for Appeals

Delay was a primary concern of the architects of court reorganization.
Prior to the creation of the court of appeals, the average litigant had to wait
one and one-half to two years for his or her appeal to be heard and decided.
As the following table shows, this time has been reduced dramatically.
Category One refers to the time interval between filing a petition for
review and the court's decision on the request. From the years 1984, 1985
and 1986, the author randomly selected twenty-four petitions for review
that were filed with the court each year. From the date of filing to the date
of court disposition, the average time was less than two months. Thus, the
average litigant in the years selected, after filing the petition for review with
the court, had to wait a little less than two months for a decision from the
court as to whether the court had granted or denied the request.
Category Two refers to the time interval between granting a petition for
review to final disposition. Again, the author chose the years 1984, 1985
and 1986, and randomly selected fifteen cases from each year. What was
77. Wis. STAT. § 809.62(1) (1985-86).
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TIME IN MONTHS: MEAN (MEDIAN)
YEAR

Pre-Ct. of
Appeals
1984
1985
1986

Category One

Category Two

Filing of
Petition to
Deny/Grant
Petition

Granting of
Petition to
Final
Disposition

Total Time
From Filing
To Final
Disposition

Not Available
1.8 mos.
1.7 mos.
1.8 mos.

Not Available
7.5 mos. (8)
7.3 mos. (7)
7.7 mos. (7)

22 mos.
9.3 mos.
9.0 mos.
9.5 mos.

sought was the length of time from the date the court granted the petition
for review to the date the court mandated the opinion.
In 1984, the average length of time was 7.5 months. The longest interval was eleven months, the shortest interval was one month, and the median
was approximately eight months.
In 1985, the average length of time was 7.3 months. The longest interval was eleven months, the shortest interval was 1.5 months, and the median was approximately seven months.
In 1986, the average length of time was 7.7 months. As in 1985, the
longest interval was eleven months, the shortest interval was 1.5 months,
and the median was seven months.
Thus, the average litigant who had his or her petition for review granted
was given a final disposition of the case within seven to eight months of the
date granted. Because the average briefing period (the time set by the court
for the parties to file their briefs) is sixty days from the date the petition is
granted, the average length of time from the date the case is ready to be
heard to the date of final disposition is five to six months.
Because eighty-five to ninety percent of all appeals are disposed of in the
court of appeals without further review by the supreme court, the obvious
question is whether the delays experienced prior to 1978 have simply shifted
to the court of appeals. The answer is no. Despite a caseload of approximately 2,400 cases a year, substantially more than was originally anticipated,7" the termination time for all cases in the years 1984, 1986 and 1987
was respectively 7.2 months, 5.9 months and 7.1 months, or an average of
approximately 6.5 months. For those cases requiring a full authored opin78. See

WISCONSIN APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE STUDY,

supra note 3.
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ion, the times for those three years respectively were 10.6 months, 10.2
months and 10.5 months (1985 was unavailable).79
In sum, the problem of delay appears to have been resolved. A litigant
used to have to wait eighteen to twenty-two months for a final disposition.
Today, a litigant who files a petition for review usually waits no more than
one to three months for that decision. If the petition for review is granted,
the average litigant waits seven months for a final opinion, two months of
which is consumed by the filing of the parties' briefs. Nor has the delay that
used to exist in the supreme court been transferred to the court of appeals.
Cases requiring a full authored opinion in that court take a little more than
ten months to complete. Thus, of all cases appealed from the trial courts,
approximately ninety percent of them are resolved in ten months or less. In
those cases that are subjected to two full reviews, one by the court of appeals and another by the supreme court, the average time is approximately
seventeen months, one month less than the minimum time it used to take
for one full review in the supreme court.
C. Collegiality of the Decision Making Process
One of the most serious concerns of the Citizens Study Committee was
the inadequacy of the time available for a collegial decision in all cases. To
the extent the term "collegiality" refers to the opportunity and realization
of full discussion of all matters before the court by all members of the court,
there is no question that the collegiality of the decision-making process is
considerably improved. The justices' responses indicate that, in essence,
each case receives all the time that any member of the court seeks to give it.
There is no time limit within which the assigned justice must write the assigned case. There are at least five reviews of each accepted case by the full
court and more when any member desires. There is no time limit set on the
justices for writing concurrences and dissents either, and the numbers of
full and thorough concurrences and dissents reflect that the justices are
availing themselves of the time.
D. Administrative and Supervisory Responsibilities
At the time of court reorganization, there was a concern that the
caseload of the supreme court left little or no time for the court to exercise
its administrative and supervisory responsibility over the courts and the
bar. The constitutional amendments passed in 1977 made it clear for the
first time that the supreme court had superintending and administrative au79. Statistics provided by Chief Judge Burton Scott, Wisconsin Court of Appeals.
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thority over all courts. The responses of the justices indicate that a much
greater amount of time has been devoted to this function since 1977. The
administrative activities of the court over the last few years, and the increased volume (nearly four-fold) of lawyer disciplinary cases, support the
justices' comments. Of equal importance is the conclusion of the justices
that the amount of time available is adequate. Thus, the objective of greater
supervisory and administrative responsibility over the courts and the bar is
being met.
E.

The Supreme Court As A Law-Stating, Law-Developing Court

An objective of court reform was to allow the supreme court to devote
more time to formulating and articulating a coherent body of jurisprudence.
If the supreme court is to succeed in that goal, then great care must be
taken in deciding what cases to review in the first instance. From the responses of all the justices, a great deal of time and attention is paid to this
function. It occupies approximately three to five days a month, time that
was not spent in this regard prior to court reorganization, inasmuch as all
cases appealed were automatically reviewed.
Whether the court's use of this time adequately selects out those cases
which do not present the opportunity for law stating or law development is
a judgment I leave to others. Nevertheless, given the amount of time available for this initial review and the amount of time available to review and
work on those cases accepted for review, the tools are certainly in place for
the court to emphasize this role if it chooses to do so.
IV.

CONCLUSION

During the course of the interviews, the justices were asked a concluding set of questions: What about court reform? Is it working better than
you anticipated? What, if anything, is worse? What would you do differently if you could rewrite the bill?
The justices, without exception, expressed respect and admiration for
the work of the court of appeals. A typical remark came from Justice Day:
"The court of appeals has been a real boon to this judicial system. You
read their opinions and you know they are really grinding it out like we
used to have to do. And they're doing it very well." 80
However, a number of justices pointed out that the caseload in the court
of appeals is substantially higher than was originally anticipated. Original
estimates projected a caseload of about 900-1,200 cases a year. That esti80. Interview with Justice Day, supra note 5.
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mate was woefully conservative. In 1984 there were 2,484 cases filed in the
court of appeals; in 1985 there were 2,434; in 1986 there were 2,275; and in
1987 there were 2,406.81 Although these figures probably indicate that the
intention of providing an easily accessible appeal at minimum expense has
been achieved,82 the justices regret that it has probably been achieved at the
expense of oral argument in the court of appeals.
I would have more judges on the court of appeals. They have a huge
volume of work they have to handle. It is regrettable that some important issues in the court of appeals do not have oral arguments at
all. Whatever number it takes, six judges83in nine districts should be
given so as to allow for oral arguments.
One final conclusion: Recent press stories84 indicate that perceptions
still exist that the court should be judged by the numbers, more precisely,
how many cases are disposed of by full written opinion. These and other
stories indicate a lack of understanding about the functions of the present
day court, the changes that have come about, and the reasons for those
changes. The work of the supreme court under the present system is far
less public than it was prior to the creation of the court of appeals. Prior to
1978, the productivity of the court could reasonably and accurately be
judged by the number of written opinions it produced during the course of
the year. It was a "numbers" court. Writing opinions, a very visible function, was the court's primary if not sole function. Today, that is not so.
Much of the work of the court is far less visible and far less interesting
to the general public. The initial review function and the administrative
and supervisory functions are seen by and affect few people. The additional
amount of time that is spent in reviewing, discussing, writing, and critiquing within the court is not all visible to the public eye.
A measuring stick taking into account solely the number of written
opinions per year may well have been an accurate measure of productivity
prior to 1978. However, a measuring stick based on numbers alone is no
longer an accurate measure. The concept of "productivity" with respect to
the court has been changed dramatically by court reorganization. The
problem, of course, is that the changed concept of productivity makes it far
more difficult to subject the present court to objective critical analysis.

81. Id.
82. Wilkie, supra note 6; see also CITIZENS STUDY COMMITTEE, supra note 2, at 82.
83. Interview with Justice Ceci, supra note 63.
84. See Kenyon, Past Unequaled: Conflict Holds Court Back Milwaukee Journal, Apr. 14,
1987, at 1,col. 2; Kenyon, JusticesDuck State's Toughest Cases, Critics Charge, Milwaukee Journal, Apr. 13, 1987, at 1, col. 2; Kenyon, Justice Awry: Collegiality Crumbles as Temperaments
Clash, Milwaukee Journal, Apr. 12, 1987, at 1, col. 4.
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How does one measure "quality"? How does one measure whether sufficient attention is paid to "law-stating, law-developing" as opposed to "error-correcting"? It is a fertile field I leave to others.

